AU Peace and Security Council Rejects Parallel Government in Sudan as February 2025 Summit-Level Meeting Demands Ceasefire

A Summit-Level Response to a Continental Crisis

On 14 February 2025, the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) convened its 1261st meeting at the level of heads of state and government to consider the situation in Sudan. The meeting, held on the margins of the 38th AU Summit in Addis Ababa, represented the highest-level collective African response to a conflict that had, by early 2025, displaced more than 10 million people and pushed parts of the country toward famine.

The council's communiqué, subsequently published on the AU's Peace and Security Department website and catalogued by ReliefWeb, reaffirmed the AU's commitment to the "independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of Sudan" and condemned all forms of foreign interference in the conflict. The meeting set the tone for the AU's Sudan policy throughout 2025 — a policy framework that would be reinforced in subsequent meetings in March, October, and December.

Rejecting Parallel Governance

A central outcome of the 1261st meeting was the council's firm rejection of any attempts to establish parallel governments or entities that threaten Sudan's national unity and territorial integrity. This position was reinforced at the 1264th meeting on 11 March 2025, where the PSC explicitly called on the international community to refrain from recognising or providing support to such entities.

The rejection of parallel governance was directed at reports that the RSF and its political allies were preparing to declare a rival government in territories under their control — a development that would have formalised the partition of Sudan and potentially entrenched the conflict. The AU's stance drew a clear line: any political solution to the Sudan crisis must preserve the unity of the Sudanese state and emerge from an inclusive, Sudanese-led process.

The El Fasher Crisis

A particularly urgent dimension of the Sudan conflict addressed throughout 2025 was the siege of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and the last major city in the Darfur region not under RSF control. The city, home to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, became a focal point of international concern as fighting intensified and humanitarian access was severely restricted.

The PSC's 1308th emergency meeting on 28 October 2025 specifically addressed the atrocities in El Fasher, calling for accountability and the protection of civilians. The council condemned the targeting of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and water facilities, and urged both parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access.

The Ceasefire Imperative

Throughout 2025, the PSC repeatedly urged the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to heed calls for a ceasefire and to commit to an "inclusive, Sudanese-led political dialogue" as the only viable path to lasting peace. This message was maintained consistently across all four major PSC meetings on Sudan during the year.

The ceasefire advocacy faced significant obstacles. Both the SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), pursued military solutions despite repeated diplomatic initiatives. Multiple mediation tracks — including those led by the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Jeddah process facilitated by the United States and Saudi Arabia — failed to produce a sustainable cessation of hostilities.

The AU's February 2025 meeting acknowledged these challenges but insisted that military victory was neither achievable nor desirable. The communiqué emphasised that a negotiated settlement was the only way to prevent the fragmentation of Sudan and the regionalisation of the conflict.

Regional and International Dimensions

The Sudan conflict has significant regional implications, drawing in neighbouring countries through refugee flows, cross-border militia movements, and geopolitical competition. The AU's rejection of foreign interference, reiterated in the February 2025 communiqué, was directed at multiple actors:

• External arms suppliers fuelling the conflict through military support to both parties
• Regional powers pursuing proxy interests through alignment with one faction
• Mercenary groups exploiting the security vacuum for resource extraction

The PSC called on all AU member states to refrain from actions that could exacerbate the conflict and to support the AU-led mediation efforts. The council also welcomed the coordination between the AU, IGAD, and the UN in pursuing a unified international approach to the crisis.

The Limits of Continental Mediation

The February 2025 summit-level meeting demonstrated both the strengths and limitations of the AU as a conflict mediator. At the political level, the meeting produced a clear, unified African position on Sudan's sovereignty and the need for a negotiated settlement. The involvement of heads of state gave the position weight and visibility.

Yet the gap between diplomatic communiqués and battlefield realities remained stark. As 2025 progressed, the fighting intensified, the humanitarian catastrophe deepened, and the prospects for a political settlement receded. The AU's continued engagement — through the March, October, and December PSC meetings — demonstrated persistence, but the fundamental dynamic of the conflict did not shift.

The Sudan case thus stands as a defining test of the AU's Peace and Security Architecture: can continental diplomacy, backed by the collective political will of 55 member states, produce peace in a conflict where external actors have deep interests and domestic parties see military advantage? The answer, as of the close of 2025, remained uncertain — but the AU's institutional commitment to engagement, dialogue, and Sudanese ownership of the process provided a framework that, however imperfect, remained the most viable path to a negotiated resolution.

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Sources

• African Union Peace and Security Council, Communique of the 1261st Meeting, 14 February 2025 — peaceau.org
• ReliefWeb, Communique: 1261st Meeting of the PSC, 14 February 2025 — reliefweb.int
• African Union PSC, Press Statement of the 1264th Meeting, 11 March 2025 — peaceau.org
• African Union PSC, Communique of the 1308th Emergency Meeting on El Fasher, 28 October 2025 — peaceau.org
• African Union PSC, Communique of the 1319th Meeting, 16 December 2025 — peaceau.org
• ACCORD, Sudan at a Crossroads: What the AU PSC's Communique Means for the Path to Peace, 2025 — accord.org.za
• The New Arab, African Union Rejects Foreign Interference in Sudan, 2025 — newarab.com