London, United Kingdom · 5 September 2025 — On 29 January 2025, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), completing a process set in motion by their joint notification of departure in January 2024. The withdrawal — dubbed Sahelexit by analysts — represents over a fifth of ECOWAS's member states and 63 million of its 409 million citizens, delivering what researchers describe as a "profound shock" to the regional organisation and signalling that fragmentation is "no longer a theoretical concern but a stark reality."
A detailed analysis published in September 2025 by researchers Stefan Gänzle (University of Agder), Tobias Hofelich (Aston University), and Jens-Uwe Wunderlich (Aston University) on the LSE Africa at LSE blog frames the withdrawal not as a complete rupture but as a case of differentiated disintegration — a concept borrowed from European Union studies that recognises regionalism as neither static nor linear.
Drivers of Exit
The analysis identifies three interconnected drivers behind the withdrawal: authoritarian consolidation and security failures, intra-regional contestation, and geopolitical realignment.
Security Failures and Authoritarian Consolidation
The immediate backdrop lies in a series of military coups between 2020 and 2023, each justified by the inability of civilian governments to counter jihadist insurgencies that have destabilised the Sahel for over a decade. Despite the creation of the G5 Sahel in 2014 — a French-backed regional security initiative — and extensive international support, the security situation worsened.
ECOWAS condemned the unconstitutional seizures of power and imposed sanctions to restore democratic rule. However, these measures failed to generate compliance. On the contrary, they generated domestic support for the juntas, as ECOWAS was increasingly perceived as a tool of Western, particularly French, influence.
Intra-Regional Contestation and Perceived Marginalisation
Beyond the immediate security crisis, the Sahel states grew disillusioned with what they perceived as asymmetries in the regional integration project. While ECOWAS had evolved from an economic bloc into a security actor, it remained unable to address the unique challenges facing its northern members, particularly the intensifying jihadist threat.
Grievances included dissatisfaction with the CFA franc currency arrangement, concerns over unequal economic development, and a sense of exclusion from key decision-making processes — often seen as dominated by ECOWAS's coastal members and subject to Western influence. The crisis exposed structural tensions: diverging security priorities, developmental disparities, and mounting distrust over the role of former colonial powers within ECOWAS governance.
Geopolitical Realignment
Sahelexit reflects a broader geopolitical realignment. As European, particularly French, influence has declined, Russia and China have emerged as alternative partners.
China has relied primarily on economic statecraft, positioning itself as a non-interventionist development partner. Since 2013, its Belt and Road Initiative has channelled loans, infrastructure investment, and trade opportunities. Chinese state-owned enterprises are deeply involved in resource extraction — from gold and iron ore mining in Burkina Faso to lithium extraction in Mali and oil production in Niger.
Russia has pursued a more militarised strategy, initially expanding influence through Wagner Group mercenaries who provided regime protection, counterinsurgency operations, and intelligence services. Since Wagner's partial restructuring, operations have moved under the newly established Africa Corps. Moscow has also cultivated leverage through mining diplomacy, including Rosatom's interest in Niger's uranium sector.
ECOWAS's Pragmatic Response: Differentiated Disintegration
Despite the rhetoric of rupture, ECOWAS's response has been cautious and pragmatic, with an ambition to "keep the door open." On the day Sahelexit took effect, the organisation announced transitional arrangements designed to preserve key forms of cooperation:
| Measure | Status Post-Withdrawal |
|---|---|
| ECOWAS-issued documents | Continued recognition |
| Trade benefits (ETLS) | Maintained |
| Visa-free travel for citizens | Preserved |
| Support for ECOWAS officials from AES states | Continued |
This approach contrasts with ECOWAS's earlier punitive stance towards Niger and reflects an implicit embrace of differentiated disintegration. The concept recognises that even after a state withdraws from a regional organisation, forms of cooperation often persist — some institutional ties are maintained, some abandoned, and new ones created.
The Alliance of Sahel States and Regional Reconfiguration
The creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023 and its evolution into a confederation signals a reorientation of regional order in the Sahel away from the Europe-inspired model of regional integration. The AES has established its own security cooperation framework, with mutual defence provisions that commit members to collective response against armed rebellion or external aggression.
However, the AES's institutional shape remains undefined. Its capacity to replace the economic functions of ECOWAS — including the Trade Liberalization Scheme, common external tariffs, and free movement of persons — remains uncertain. The three Sahel states collectively face significant economic challenges, including roughly 17 million acutely food-insecure people and limited fiscal space.
Implications for African Regionalism
The analysis by Gänzle, Hofelich, and Wunderlich argues that while ECOWAS's transitional mechanisms may mitigate immediate disruption, they do little to resolve the deeper political, security, and developmental fractures that led to Sahelexit. The growing divide between the Sahel states and coastal West African countries remains unaddressed.
The researchers conclude that both ECOWAS and the African Union must adapt. This requires not only a more inclusive and responsive model of cooperation but also a recalibration of normative assumptions about regional integration, particularly the automatic alignment with Western models. If West African regionalism is to remain resilient, it must evolve from a project of convergence to one of flexible unity, capable of sustaining coherence in an increasingly multipolar and fractured global order.
Sources
- Gänzle, S., Hofelich, T., and Wunderlich, J., Sahelexit raises questions about the future of West African integration, LSE Africa at LSE, 5 September 2025. Available at:
- European Parliamentary Research Service, Sahelexit: The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS, EPRS_BRI(2024)762295. Available at:
- CDD Ghana, Towards A Post-Exit Transitional Framework for ECOWAS-AES Relations, March 2026. Available at:
- ECOWAS Commission, Council of Ministers Extraordinary Session on Withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 2025. Available at:
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